Adjudicated Juveniles and Collateral Relief by Tepfer, Joshua A. & Nirider, Laura H.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 64 
Number 2 Symposium: 
Balancing Fairness With Finality: 
An Examination of Post-Conviction Review 
Article 10 
June 2012 
Adjudicated Juveniles and Collateral Relief 
Joshua A. Tepfer 
Laura H. Nirider 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua A. Tepfer & Laura H. Nirider, Adjudicated Juveniles and Collateral Relief, 64 Me. L. Rev. 553 
(2012). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
 
 
ADJUDICATED JUVENILES AND COLLATERAL 
RELIEF 
Joshua A. Tepfer & Laura H. Nirider  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 II.  JUVENILES AND POST-ADJUDICATION LITIGATION 
  A. Adjudicated Juveniles Need Collateral Relief 
  B. National Outlook: Access Unclear 
 III.  CASE STUDIES 
  A. Alberto M. 
  B. Robert Taylor and Jonathan Barr 
 IV.  CONCLUSION 
  
554 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2 
ADJUDICATED JUVENILES AND COLLATERAL 
RELIEF 
Joshua A. Tepfer* & Laura H. Nirider** 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Collateral relief is a vital part of the American criminal justice system.  By 
filing post-conviction petitions after the close of direct appeal, defendants can raise 
claims based on evidence outside the record that was not known or available at the 
time of trial.  One common use of post-conviction relief is to file a claim related to 
a previously unknown constitutional violation that occurred at trial, such as 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  If a defendant’s trial attorney performed 
ineffectively by failing to call, for instance, an alibi witness, then that omission is 
unlikely to be reflected in the trial record—but in post-conviction proceedings, the 
defendant may seek to expand the record to include evidence of such 
ineffectiveness.  If a court, sitting in post-conviction, hears that evidence and sides 
with the defendant, the usual remedy is to grant a new trial.  Without access to the 
opportunities to supplement the record that are afforded by these collateral 
proceedings, however, a defendant who suffers ineffective assistance of counsel 
often has no opportunity for relief. 
Collateral proceedings are also often used to raise newly discovered evidence 
of innocence.  This use of post-conviction proceedings, in particular, has met with 
much success, especially since the development of DNA technology has enabled 
attorneys to subject trial evidence to scientific testing and to introduce the test 
results as newly discovered evidence of innocence.  To date, 291 individuals have 
been exonerated by DNA testing,1 all of it conducted through collateral 
proceedings.  Each of these individuals stands as living proof of the fact that access 
to post-conviction relief is an essential part of a justice-seeking judicial system.  
This article examines the troubling disparities in access to collateral relief 
between criminal and juvenile court that appear to occur in many jurisdictions.  
Some states explicitly make collateral relief unavailable to defendants who are tried 
as juveniles, even while granting such access to adults.  In many other states, 
legislatures have drafted laws governing the availability of post-conviction relief 
that are vague and ambiguous, leading to uncertainty about whether adjudicated 
juveniles may take advantage of such proceedings.  This disparity exists despite the 
fact that those tried in juvenile court need access to collateral remedies just as much 
as those tried in adult court. 
                                                                                                                 
 * Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Project Co-
Director, Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern University 
School of Law.  The authors thank Steven Drizin for reviewing drafts of this article and providing 
helpful comments. This article would not have been completed without the invaluable research 
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 ** Adjunct Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; Project Co-Director, Center on 
Wrongful Convictions of Youth, Bluhm Legal Clinic, Northwestern University School of Law. 
        1. INNOCENCE PROJECT, www.innocenceproject.org (last visited May 25, 2012). 
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Part II of this article explains that individuals adjudicated in juvenile court may 
be in particular need of collateral remedies, while demonstrating that their access to 
these remedies is far too often unclear, severely limited, or explicitly denied.  Part 
III offers two examples of real-life juvenile defendants who either were or would 
have been harmed by the unavailability of collateral relief.  Part IV concludes with 
a call for clarity and increased juvenile access to collateral proceedings nationwide. 
II. JUVENILES AND POST-ADJUDICATION LITIGATION 
A.  Adjudicated Juveniles Need Collateral Relief 
The ability to invoke collateral relief is critical for adjudicated juveniles.  
Youth have been shown to be especially vulnerable as a population to wrongful 
conviction—and, in particular, to false confession.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized on several occasions, juveniles are categorically less mature, less able 
to weigh risks and long-term consequences, more vulnerable to external pressures, 
and more compliant with authority figures than are adults.2  The Court has 
concluded, in turn, that these youthful traits mean that the risk of false confession is 
“all the more troubling” and “all the more acute” when the “subject of a custodial 
interrogation is a juvenile.”3  This conclusion has roots that extend back to the 1967 
Supreme Court case In re Gault, in which the Supreme Court explained that 
“authoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon the reliability and 
trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by children.”4   
A slew of empirical studies have affirmed the accuracy of this conclusion.  The 
leading study of 125 proven false confession cases, cited by the Supreme Court in 
Corley v. United States and J.D.B. v. North Carolina, found that 63% of false 
confessors were under the age of twenty-five and 32% were under eighteen.5  By 
way of comparison, contemporaneous statistics reveal that juveniles made up only 
8% of the individuals arrested for murder and 16% of the individuals arrested for 
rape in the United States.6  In another respected study of 340 exonerations that have 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026-27 
(2010). 
 3. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011).  See also Corley v. United States, 556 
U.S. 303, 320-21 (2009) (“[T]here is mounting empirical evidence that these pressures [associated with 
custodial interrogation] can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they 
never committed”) (citations omitted). 
 4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 52 (1967). While Gault may be the first explicit example of the U.S. 
Supreme Court questioning the reliability of statements made by juveniles during custodial 
interrogation, the Court previously had questioned the voluntariness of juvenile statements made during 
intensive interrogation. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (“A 15-year old lad, 
questioned through the dead of night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men 
possibly might stand the ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m. But we cannot believe that a lad of tender years 
is a match for the police in such a contest”); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (“[A] 14-
year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him 
when he is made accessible only to the police [for interrogation]”). 
 5. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 
82 N.C.L. REV. 891, 945 (2004). 
 6. HOWARD N. SNYDER, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE 
ARRESTS 2004, at 2 (2006), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/214563.pdf. 
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taken place since 1989, researchers found that juveniles under the age of eighteen 
were three times as likely to falsely confess as adults; a full 42% of juvenile 
exonerees in that study had falsely confessed, compared to only 13% of wrongfully 
convicted adults.7  And the most recent study addressing the subject—an 
examination of 103 wrongful convictions of factually innocent teenagers and 
children—found that a false confession contributed to 31.1% of the juvenile cases 
studied, as compared against only 17.8% of adult wrongful convictions.8  
Laboratory studies, moreover, have replicated these real-world empirics.  In one 
study, a majority of juvenile participants complied with a request to sign a false 
confession without uttering a word of protest.9  The study concluded that juveniles 
between the ages of twelve and sixteen were far more likely to falsely confess than 
young adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six.10 
This higher incidence of false confessions among juveniles exists because 
standard police tactics—which in all probability were designed with the hardened 
adult suspect in mind—are frequently deployed against far softer targets: children 
and adolescents.11  Despite their common use during interrogations of children and 
adolescents, however, these tactics pose a particular risk to young suspects.  In 
recognition of this fact, even John E. Reid & Associates—the leading police 
interrogation training firm in the country—recommends “special caution” when 
interrogating children.12  Sadly, this recommendation goes underemphasized in 
Reid’s interrogation manual and trainings, and is rarely implemented in real life. 
The problem of false confessions from children is particularly troubling 
because once a defendant has confessed, his or her conviction is all but guaranteed.  
Despite substantial evidence to the contrary, prosecutors, judges, jurors, and even 
some defense attorneys continue to adhere to the misapprehension that individuals 
do not confess to crimes they did not commit, resulting in wrongful prosecutions 
and convictions.  Indeed, one Supreme Court justice has recognized that, for all 
practical purposes, “the introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a 
trial in court superfluous”—a statement that holds true even for those who have 
falsely confessed.13  Confessions can be so prejudicial that they can persuade jurors 
to convict despite the existence of significant exculpatory evidence, such as 
conflicting physical evidence, contradictory accounts from witnesses, and alibis.14    
                                                                                                                 
 7. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 545 (2005). 
 8. Joshua A. Tepfer, Laura H. Nirider, & Lynda Tricarico, Arresting Development: Convictions of 
Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 904 (2010). 
 9. See Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: 
The Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 150-51 (2003). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions Regarding 
Juvenile Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25 BEHAV. SCI. L. 757, 759 (2007). 
 12. JOHN E. REID & ASSOCS., INC, CLARIFYING MISINFORMATION ABOUT THE REID TECHNIQUE 1 
(2012), available at www.reid.com/pdfs/20120311.pdf. 
 13. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting E. CLEARY, 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 316 (2d ed. 1972)).  See Drizin & Leo, supra note 5, at 958 (81% of false 
confessors who took their cases to trial were convicted). 
 14. See Lisa E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence: Can 
Confessions Corrupt Eyewitness Identifications?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 122, 122 (2009). 
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While the research on juvenile wrongful convictions is best developed in the 
arena of false confessions, there is reason to believe that youth may be particularly 
vulnerable to other types of evidentiary problems and errors that can also lead to 
wrongful convictions.  Crimes involving youth often happen in groups, and the 
witnesses presented against children are often children themselves.15  Those 
youthful witnesses may be particularly vulnerable even to unintentional suggestion 
during line-ups and other eyewitness identification procedures, due to an inherent 
desire to please authority figures or a simple desire to end the unpleasant 
experience of being at the police station.16  All this is to say, in short, that no matter 
in which court their cases are tried, the mere fact of youthfulness makes children 
and teens more likely to be wrongfully convicted.  As it so happens, most cases 
involving teens end up in juvenile court. 
This fact, however, presents a second problem.  The peculiar institution of 
juvenile court itself can be a “breeding ground” for wrongful convictions and 
constitutional violations, including ineffective assistance of counsel.17  Juvenile 
court originated as an institution at the turn of the twentieth century, when 
reformers envisioned a body that would handle young people’s transgressions with 
an eye to rehabilitation and treatment, rather than punishment and long-term 
incarceration.18  To facilitate this emphasis on rehabilitation, some of the 
adversarial aspects of adult criminal court were removed from juvenile court; for 
instance, all individuals in the courtroom—prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
judges alike—were conceived of as benevolent actors seeking to promote 
children’s “best interests” and welfare.19 
Unfortunately, these well-intentioned features of juvenile court, over time, 
have bred a court culture that today discourages and sometimes precludes zealous 
and adversarial advocacy.20  Many juvenile courts continue to view zealous 
advocacy as “antithetical to rehabilitation.”21  Some attorneys, believing that their 
clients will be best served by submitting to the consequences of a juvenile 
adjudication, may fail to research and investigate cases even when their clients 
request it.22  They may fail to interview witnesses or visit the crime scene; they 
may omit to file pre-trial motions; and they may even arrive at dispositional 
hearings unprepared.23  Scholars have suggested that ineffective assistance of 
counsel, sadly, is “routine and widespread” in this context.24  Without post-
                                                                                                                 
 15. Tepfer et al., supra note 8, at 908-10. 
 16. Id. at 921.  
 17. See Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful 
Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
 18. See id. at 262. 
 19. See Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 
MINN. L. REV. 141, 150 (1984). 
 20. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (noting that juvenile court 
proceedings lack the “fully adversary” character of adult criminal trials). 
 21. Katayoon Majd & Patricia Puritz, The Cost of Justice: How Low-Income Youth Continue to Pay 
the Price of Failing Indigent Defense Systems, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 543, 555 (2009). 
 22. See Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in 
Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 771, 794-95 (2010). 
 23. Id. at 792-93. 
 24. Id. at 791. 
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adjudication access, however, much of this ineffectiveness may never be remedied. 
The apparent prevalence of ineffectiveness in juvenile court, in turn, circles 
back to an increased risk of wrongful convictions.25  By discouraging juvenile 
defenders from zealously subjecting the State’s claims to the full-blown “crucible 
of meaningful adversarial testing,” juvenile court culture makes reliability a 
secondary concern.26  In effect, accurate fact-finding can be subordinated to the 
attorney’s or court’s perception of the child’s best interests and need for 
treatment.27 
Because of the potential for ineffective assistance of counsel and the 
susceptibility of juvenile defendants to wrongful conviction, it is imperative to 
ensure that adjudicated juveniles have access to collateral relief that will allow 
them to raise and remedy these issues in court.  Although adjudicated juveniles 
may not suffer penal consequences directly on par with convicted criminals in adult 
court, they can still be detained and  sentenced for prolonged periods of time.  
Adjudications of delinquency, moreover, can and often do have far-reaching 
secondary consequences, such as lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles 
who have been adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses,28 restrictions from 
serving in the military,29 eviction from public housing,30 and immigration-related 
penalties.31  Unfortunately, however, the nature and extent of juveniles’ access to 
collateral relief is far from clear in many jurisdictions.  In some jurisdictions, 
moreover, such access is explicitly denied. 
B.  National Outlook: Access Unclear 
Efforts to prove innocence after conviction are ubiquitous in jurisdictions all 
over the country.  By far, the most generally accepted means of belatedly proving 
innocence is through DNA testing.  Since the nation’s first DNA exoneration in 
1989, individuals have been exonerated through post-conviction DNA testing in 
thirty-six states.32  Forty-nine states,33 the District of Columbia,34 and the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 432 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting) (juvenile 
adjudications “may well lack the reliability of real convictions in criminal courts”). 
 26. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984). 
 27. Majd & Puritz, supra note 21, at 555-56 (describing reports that juvenile courts and judges place 
a “premium” on “maintaining a friendly atmosphere” that discourages some attorneys from filing 
motions or pursuing defenses). 
 28. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(A)(3)(a), (5) (2010); In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747 
(Ill. 2003). 
 29. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 601-210, ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENTS ENLISTMENT 
PROGRAM ¶¶ 4-4, 4-32 (2011). 
 30. See Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002) (upholding the practice 
of evicting tenants from public housing due to their illegal conduct). 
 31. See Wallace v. Gonzalez, 463 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ consideration of a prior juvenile adjudication in deciding whether to grant an alien’s 
application for adjustment of status). 
 32. Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2012). 
 33. Oklahoma is the only state that does not have a DNA testing statute.  See infra notes 37-42 and 
accompanying text.  Until this year, Massachusetts also lacked a post-conviction DNA testing statute, 
but a new law was signed by the Governor on February 17, 2012.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278A 
(effective May 17, 2012). 
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government35 have post-conviction DNA testing statutes on the books.  Although 
these DNA testing laws have enabled 291 convicted individuals to be proven 
innocent, not a single one of those individuals had been adjudicated delinquent in 
juvenile court, despite the fact that every jurisdiction has a separate juvenile court 
system.36 
A closer look at the various post-conviction DNA statutes may offer at least 
one explanation.  Of the fifty jurisdictions that have post-conviction DNA testing 
statutes, only five—Colorado,37 the District of Columbia,38 New Hampshire,39 
South Carolina,40 and Wisconsin41—explicitly allow young people who have been 
adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court to seek relief under those statutes.  While 
the remaining jurisdictions’ statutes do not directly address juvenile access to post-
adjudication DNA testing, there are strong reasons to believe that juveniles may not 
seek relief under many of those statutes. 
The vast majority of DNA testing statutes share a common wording that limits 
access to those “convicted of” a crime or felony.  Forty-one jurisdictions use this 
language or something similar.42  This wording, however, may have the effect of 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See D.C. CODE § 22-4133 (2012). 
 35. See Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (2004). 
 36. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30822, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS AND 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT AND RELATED MATTERS 
(2004), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/1143.pdf (discussing scope 
of federal juvenile jurisdiction); Carol S. Stevenson et al., The Juvenile Court: Analysis and 
Recommendations, THE JUVENILE COURT, Winter 1996, at 4, available at 
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/06_03_Analysis.pdf (all fifty states have a 
juvenile court system); COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, GUIDE TO THE D.C. JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (2009), available at http://www.courtexcellence.org/uploads/publications/ 
DCJuvenileJusticeGuideEnglish_Final.pdf (discussing the District of Columbia’s juvenile court 
system). 
 37. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-411(d) (2012) (including an individual incarcerated in “a juvenile 
facility following adjudication for an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult” 
among those who may access the statute). 
 38. D.C. CODE § 22-4133 (including those “adjudicated as a delinquent”). 
 39. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-D:2 (2012) (providing access after “adjudication as a delinquent”). 
 40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-30 (2012) (including those “adjudicated delinquent”). 
 41. WIS. STAT. § 974.07 (2012) (including those “adjudicated delinquent”). 
 42. Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2012)), Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (West 
2012)), Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-20 (West 2012)), California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 
(West 2012)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk (West 2012)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11, § 4504 (West 2012)), Florida (FLA. STAT. § 925.11 (2012)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41 
(West 2012)), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-121 (2012)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4901 
(West 2012)), Illinois (725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/166-3 (2012)), Indiana (IND. CODE. § 35-38-7-5 (2012)), 
Iowa (IOWA CODE § 81.10 (2012)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2012)), Louisiana (LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 926.1 (West 2012)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 2137 (2012)), Maryland (MD. CODE 
ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West 2012)), Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16 (2012)), Minnesota 
(MINN. STAT. § 590.01 (2012)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-110 (West 2012)), Nebraska 
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120 (2012)), Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.0918 (2012)), New Jersey (N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2012)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2 (West 2012)), 
North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2012)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-15 
(2012)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.71-.84 (West 2012)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 136.690 
(2012)), Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2012)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-12 
(2012)), South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-1 (2012)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-
303 (2012)), Texas (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01 (West 2012)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 
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excluding young people who have been adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court.43  
State and federal laws generally draw a clear distinction between a “conviction” in 
criminal court and an “adjudication” in juvenile court.44  Take, for example, 
California law, which holds that “an order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the 
juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose.”45  At 
the same time, California’s post-conviction DNA testing statute limits access to any 
person “convicted of a felony.”46  Under basic principles of statutory construction, 
it is difficult to imagine that an adjudicated juvenile is encompassed within the 
DNA statute.47  
                                                                                                                 
78B-9-300 (West 2012)), Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5561 (West 2012)), Virginia (VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (West 2012)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2012)), West Virginia 
(W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-14 (2012)), Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-301 (West 2012)).  See also 
infra note 47 for a discussion of Florida, Idaho, and Rhode Island’s statutes, which are worded slightly 
differently and may present different issues of statutory interpretation. 
  Alabama and Kentucky limit their post-conviction DNA testing to individuals convicted of a 
“capital offense.”  ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (2012); KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285 (West 2012).  
Although an adjudicated delinquent could never receive a “capital sentence,” it appears under those 
states’ definitions that a juvenile could be adjudicated of a capital offense.  ALA. CODE § 13A-5-39 
(2012) (Alabama defining a capital offense as “[a]n offense for which a defendant shall be punished by 
a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole according to the provisions of this article”); KY 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 640.040 (West 2011) (noting that a youthful offender can be adjudicated of a capital 
offense).  The same question lingers regarding whether an “adjudication” of a capital offense would be 
deemed the same thing as a “conviction” of a capital offense.  See infra notes 44-46. 
 43. It is fairly clear that juveniles who are charged and convicted in adult criminal court or who are 
otherwise given an adult sentence would be allowed to access DNA testing statutes.  See e.g., N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-18(C) (West 2012) (“If a judgment on a proceeding under the Delinquency Act 
results in an adult sentence, the determination of guilt at trial becomes a conviction for purposes of the 
Criminal Code.”). 
 44. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 850 N.E.2d 134, 147 (Ill. 2006) (holding that a juvenile who escapes 
from detention after an adjudication of delinquency cannot be convicted under an escape statute that 
limits its application to those “convicted of a felony”); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 
(10th Cir. 1990) (explaining that juvenile delinquency is “an adjudication of status--not a criminal 
conviction”). 
 45. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 203 (West 2012). 
 46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2012). 
 47. At least three states use language that, while ambiguous as to whether it includes adjudicated 
juveniles, may allow for better statutory interpretation arguments to the effect that it does.  Mississippi 
grants access to “any person sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi”; Missouri allows 
“a person in the custody of the department of corrections” to file a motion; and New York states merely 
that a “defendant” may bring a motion.  See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5 (West 2012); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 547.035 (2012); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1a) (McKinney 2012). The question in these states 
turns not on whether an “adjudication” is the same thing as a “conviction,” but on whether an 
adjudicated juvenile is “sentenced by a court of record” to “the department of corrections” or whether a 
charged and adjudicated juvenile was a “defendant.” 
  Two states use statutory language that grants access to individuals “convicted of or sentenced” 
in connection with a crime or felony.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4901 (West 2012); R.I. GEN LAWS § 
10-9.1-12 (2012) (italics added).  Juvenile petitioners in these states may claim that they fall within 
these statutes by arguing that they were “sentenced,” even if they were not technically “convicted.”  But 
see United States v. Moorer, 383 F.3d 164, 169 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Under the New Jersey Code of 
Juvenile Justice, juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent are not sentenced but rather are subject to a 
‘dispositional hearing.’” (citations omitted)); In re J.J.M., 701 N.E.2d 1170, 1174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) 
(adjudicated juveniles are neither convicted nor given sentences).  The vast majority of state statutes in 
which the term “sentencing” appears, however, use the conjunction “and,” which does not appear to aid 
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The structure of the Maine statutory scheme suggests the same conclusion. 
Access to post-conviction DNA testing in Maine is governed by title 15, section 
2138 of the Maine Revised Statutes, which allows “a person convicted of and 
sentenced for” certain crimes to seek testing.48  The statute does delineate those 
who may seek relief—such as individuals who are on parole—but adjudicated 
juveniles are not mentioned.49  Even further, Maine statutes and case law make 
clear that a delinquency adjudication is not the equivalent of a felony conviction.50  
And the Maine statute governing non-DNA post-conviction claims for relief 
specifies clearly that adjudicated juveniles may seek relief under that statute—thus 
suggesting an intentional contrast between the scopes of the non-DNA and DNA 
post-conviction statutes.51  While there does not appear to be any case law in Maine 
addressing this issue,52 this statutory backdrop suggests that adjudicated juveniles 
are likely not encompassed within the DNA testing statute. 
In fact, there appears to be little case law addressing this precise question in 
any jurisdiction.  One of the few courts to address the issue—in Texas—has 
strongly suggested that juveniles cannot seek DNA testing when the DNA testing 
statute limits relief to those who have been “convicted.”  Texas’ post-conviction 
DNA testing statute is found at article 64.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which allows a “convicted person” to seek testing.53  In the case of In re R.J.M.,54 a 
juvenile sought leave to seek relief under this statute after his adjudication for 
aggravated sexual assault.  The lower court denied the motion, finding that there 
were “no reasonable grounds for a motion to be filed.”55  In dismissing the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction, the appellate court noted that the legislature did not 
explicitly authorize a juvenile’s appeal of a denial of such a motion.56  The court 
explained that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not generally apply to 
adjudicated juveniles unless the legislature specifically “evinces a contrary 
intent.”57  It went on to note that no contrary intent appears in the DNA testing 
                                                                                                                 
the statutory argument.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (West 2012) (limited to individuals 
“convicted of and sentenced for”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk (“convicted of a crime and sentenced 
to”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-121 (2012) (“convicted of and sentenced for”); ME. REV. STAT. tit 15, § 
2138 (2012) (“convicted of and sentenced for”).  One state, Florida, presents a similar issue: its statute 
permits DNA testing for those who have been “found guilty,” which could arguably include adjudicated 
juveniles.  See FLA. STAT. § 925.11 (2012); A.S.F. v. State, 70 So. 3d 754, 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2011) (referencing a juvenile who was “found guilty” of a crime); but see State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 
111 (Fla. 2002) (if the legislature had intended to include adjudicated juveniles within the scope of a 
different Act, it could have specifically said so). 
 48. ME. REV. STAT. tit 15, § 2138 (2012). 
 49. Id. § 2138(1). 
 50. Id. § 3310(6); State v. Brockelbank, 2011 ME 118, 33 A.3d 925. 
 51. ME. REV. STAT. tit 15, §§ 2121-32.  Specifically, see section 2121(1), specifying that a 
“criminal judgment” includes an “adjudication and disposition in a juvenile case.” 
 52. Only two published appellate cases address the post-conviction DNA statute in Maine.  See 
Cookson v. State, 2011 ME 53, 17 A.3d 1208; State v. Donovan, 2004 ME 81, 853 A.2d 772.  Neither 
addresses this issue. 
 53. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a-1) (West 2012). 
 54. 211 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
 55. Id. at 394. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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statute; rather, that statute is limited to those who have been “convicted,” and the 
Texas Family Code specifically states that “an order of an adjudication . . . is not a 
conviction of crime.”58  Although the specific holding in this case was that an 
adjudicated juvenile cannot appeal the denial of a DNA testing motion, the 
decision strongly suggests that an adjudicated juvenile also cannot file such a 
motion in the first place. 
Beyond the fundamental unfairness of not allowing adjudicated juveniles 
opportunities to prove their innocence, the apparent lack of juvenile access to post-
conviction DNA testing in most jurisdictions also creates a troubling contradiction.  
The vast majority of states require juveniles to contribute a DNA sample to the 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS)—a national DNA database developed to 
assist state and federal law enforcement agencies—after an adjudication of guilt in 
juvenile court.59  For example, Kentucky and California, which appear to deny 
juveniles the right to seek post-conviction DNA testing, still require adjudicated 
juveniles to submit their DNA profiles into CODIS.60  These statutory schemes 
create an odd dichotomy: juveniles’ DNA can be used only to prove their guilt, not 
their innocence. 
Statutes and rules governing the availability of other, non-DNA forms of 
collateral relief—such as state-level writs of habeas corpus—often suffer from the 
same infirmity as DNA statutes: in many jurisdictions, it remains uncertain as to 
whether such relief is available to adjudicated juveniles.  For example, Arizona 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 provides one method for pursuing state-level post-
conviction relief; as with the vast majority of DNA testing statutes, however, this 
provision limits access to those who have been “convicted” of a criminal offense.61  
Indeed, the Arizona statute explicitly lists several categories of defendants who are 
permitted to file under this section—such as those who have violated probation—
yet it omits to mention adjudicated juveniles.62  Given this statutory backdrop, it is 
unclear, if not unlikely, that this provision is applicable to adjudicated juveniles.  In 
other states, including North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, it is 
equally doubtful that adjudicated juveniles may seek relief for similar reasons.63 
Although some states explicitly allow equal access64—including Maine, as 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.13 (a) (2005)). 
 59. See SETH AXELRAD, AM. SOC’Y OF LAW, MED. & ETHICS, SURVEY OF STATE DNA DATABASE 
STATUTES (2004), available at http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/guide.pdf.  The same information is 
also available in spreadsheet form at http://www.aslme.org/dna_04/grid/ statute_grid_4_5_2006.html. 
 60. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.174 (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 296 (West 2012). 
 61. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-01 (2012) (limiting access to post-conviction procedures to 
persons “convicted of and sentenced for a crime”); OR. REV. STAT. § 419C.400 (2012) (limited to 
persons “convicted of a crime”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2012) (limiting post-conviction relief to 
persons “convicted of a crime”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-1 (2012) (limiting post-conviction relief to 
persons “convicted of or sentenced for” a crime). 
 64. See e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-12-23(b) (2012) (allowing judges to appoint counsel for adjudicated 
juveniles seeking habeas corpus or other collateral relief); D.C. CODE § 16-2335.01(a) (2012) (allowing 
adjudicated juveniles to seek a new hearing on the grounds of actual innocence); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2953.21 (West 2012) (allowing “any person convicted of a criminal offense or adjudicated a 
delinquent child” to pursue collateral relief); In re Interest of J.M., 246 A.2d 536, 538-39 (N.J. Juv. & 
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1968) (allowing the delinquent juvenile collateral relief); Robinson v. Boley State Sch. 
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outlined above—a handful of states throughout the country explicitly prohibit 
adjudicated juveniles from seeking state-court collateral remedies.  For example, 
adjudicated juveniles in Illinois are not permitted to seek relief pursuant to the 
Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the traditional means by which convicted adults raise 
non-forensic actual innocence claims and other constitutional violations.65  
Similarly, neither Arkansas66 nor Texas67 juveniles have access to state habeas 
corpus relief. 
The South Carolina statutory scheme also appears to prohibit adjudicated 
juveniles from seeking non-DNA collateral relief.  Recall that South Carolina was 
one of only five states to explicitly include juveniles in its post-conviction DNA 
testing statute.68  Conversely, South Carolina’s Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure 
Act limits access to non-forensic collateral relief to those persons who have been 
“convicted” of a crime.69  The legislature’s failure to explicitly mention adjudicated 
juveniles in this statute when it had done so in the DNA context strongly suggests 
that juveniles do not have access to non-DNA collateral remedies. 
Other statutory schemes provide some means for adjudicated juveniles to seek 
collateral remedies, even while limiting their access to a greater degree than 
similarly situated adults.  Consider Illinois, which prohibits juvenile access to the 
Post-Conviction Hearing Act as explained above, but which does allow adults and 
juveniles alike to seek relief from judgments based on errors of fact.70  Although 
adult criminal defendants must seek this type of relief within the two-year period 
following their convictions,71 the Illinois statutory scheme allows adjudicated 
juveniles only one year to pursue equivalent relief.72  There is no apparent reason 
for this discrepancy.  
In short, most jurisdictions have not established clear rules as to whether 
adjudicated juveniles have the same rights as adults to seek relief through collateral 
proceedings.  Despite this lack of clarity, there is good reason to believe that access 
to all forms of collateral relief is severely limited for many adjudicated juveniles 
across the country.  As exemplified by the two Illinois case studies below, these 
limitations are, or can be, disastrous.  
                                                                                                                 
for Boys, 554 P.2d 44, 46 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that as a matter of equal protection, 
juveniles must be afforded access to post-conviction procedures); State ex rel. R.S. v. Trent, 289 S.E.2d 
166, 177 (W. Va. 1982) (granting state habeas relief to a West Virginia juvenile). 
 65. See In re A.G., 746 N.E.2d 732, 737 (Ill. 2001) (citing In re A.W.H., 420 N.E.2d 1041, 1042-43 
(Ill. 1981); In re R.R., 394 N.E.2d 75, 76-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)) (for the proposition that the Illinois 
high court has not reviewed lower court decisions holding that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does 
not apply to juvenile proceedings).  See also People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1332-33 (Ill. 
1996) (explaining that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act can be utilized to make claims of actual 
innocence and other constitutional violations). 
 66. Robinson v. Shock, 667 S.W.2d 956, 958-59 (Ark. 1984). 
 67. Ex parte Valle, 104 S.W.3d 888, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that adjudicated juveniles 
cannot request habeas relief because they were not “convicted”). 
 68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-30(A) (2012). 
 69. Id. § 17-27-20. 
 70. People v. Gandy, 591 N.E.2d 45, 64-65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401 
(2012); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-32 (2012). 
 71.  735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1401(c) (2012). 
 72. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-32 (2012). 
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III. CASE STUDIES  
A.  Alberto M. 
In early 1999, Alberto M., a twelve-year-old Latino boy living in Chicago with 
his parents, older sister, and two younger brothers, was having a difficult time.73  
His mother suffered from depression, anxiety, and possible bipolar disorder,74 
while his father abused drugs and alcohol,75 all of which created a volatile home 
environment.76  Perhaps in response, Alberto started lashing out and acting 
inappropriately, getting in some trouble at school and home.  Before long, he 
started encountering law enforcement.  In March 1999, after an altercation with his 
mother, he was arrested for domestic battery.77  The case never made it to court, but 
it signaled mounting problems for Alberto. 
In May, a distraught Alberto started telling friends that he was going to kill 
himself.78  When he was discovered with a rope and a knife, he was admitted to a 
children’s hospital, where he received two weeks of intensive psychological 
therapy.79  He was also prescribed antidepressants and drugs designed to mitigate 
his attention deficit disorder.80 
Alberto’s problems multiplied greatly in September, however, when the Cook 
County State’s Attorney’s Office filed a petition for adjudication of wardship 
against him, alleging that Alberto had committed acts of sexual penetration against 
his nine-year-old brother, Evan.81  According to the charges and court records, 
Alberto, who by this time had turned thirteen years old, was in his room with his 
brother Evan when he became aroused by a female wrestler on the television.82  
Alberto then allegedly sexually penetrated his brother.83  Law enforcement became 
involved after Evan allegedly told their mother, who alerted Alberto’s therapist, 
who then called the police.84  Under questioning, Alberto confessed to committing 
these acts, while nine-year-old Evan also allegedly made statements implicating his 
brother.85 
Outside of law enforcement’s presence, however, Alberto told a far different 
                                                                                                                 
 73. The authors of this article represented Alberto in later proceedings, as noted infra.  Some 
information discussed herein arises from their personal knowledge and experience with the case.  The 
names of Alberto and his younger brother Evan have been changed to protect their identities. 
 74. Lutheran Social Services of Illinois, Psychiatric Evaluation, A.M., Oct. 27, 2000 [hereinafter 
Psychiatric Evaluation, Oct. 27, 2000] (on file with authors); Children’s Memorial Hospital, Discharge 
Summary, A.M., Feb. 4, 2000 (on file with authors). 
 75. Psychiatric Evaluation, Oct. 27, 2000, supra note 74. 
 76. Children’s Memorial Hospital, Discharge Summary, A.M., May 19, 1999 (on file with authors). 
 77. Chicago Police Department, Juvenile Summary Report, A.M. (on file with authors); Juvenile 
Court of Cook County, Social Investigation, A.M., June 13, 2000, at 4 [hereinafter Social Investigation, 
June 13, 2000] (on file with authors). 
 78. Social Investigation, June 13, 2000, supra note 77, at 6. 
 79. Id.   
 80. Id. at 7.   
 81. Petition for Adjudication of Wardship – Amended, In re A.M., (on file with authors). 
 82. Social Investigation, June 13, 2000, supra note 77, at 4. 
 83. Id.    
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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version of the events that led to his charges.  According to Alberto, he and his 
brother were swimming nude in a family member’s pool.  While they were playing 
in the water, they began re-enacting a scene from Mulan, a 1998 animated Disney 
film, in which Alberto lifted his younger brother over his head.  As they were doing 
so, their mother entered the pool area, saw them naked, overreacted, and called the 
police.  When brought to the police station, Alberto was bombarded with questions 
from police officers, who accused him of committing sexual acts against his 
brother.  After what seemed like hours of constant questioning and the police’s 
adamant refusal to accept his denials, Alberto gave in.  Scared and confused, he 
admitted to what the police were saying he did to his brother.  Next thing Alberto 
knew, he was shipped off to the detention center and charged with serious crimes in 
juvenile court. 
Although Alberto was released from detention after just a couple of days, he 
wasn’t allowed back home.  As the case wound its way through juvenile court, he 
was placed in the custody of the pastor of the family’s church.86  Alberto’s 
problems, however, continued to escalate.  Shortly after the New Year, Alberto was 
readmitted to the hospital for a week’s worth of psychological treatment.87  He had 
been acting erratically, including episodes of uncontrolled laughter and sobbing, 
and teachers reported that he spoke nonsensically at times.88  He also had run away 
twice and allegedly had verbally and physically intimidated his guardian.89  To 
further complicate matters, his older sister had been hospitalized following her own 
suicide attempt just two weeks earlier.90  After his hospital admission, Alberto was 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed lithium.91  
At the same time, however, the State’s case against Alberto suffered a 
significant setback.  Per a court order, Alberto was evaluated by a psychologist, 
who determined that Alberto was incapable of knowingly understanding and 
waiving his Miranda rights.92  In light of these conclusions, the Cook County 
State’s Attorney was in all probability barred from using Alberto’s confession 
against him at an adjudicatory hearing.  Perhaps in response, the State offered 
Alberto a deal: in exchange for dropping seven of the eight allegations, including 
the most serious charges, Alberto could plead guilty to one count of sexual conduct 
with a family member under the age of eighteen and avoid detention entirely.93  
The deal required him to be on probation for five years and do some community 
service.94  Alberto’s counsel also explained to him that the deal required his 
registration as a sex offender for a period of ten years.95  Given the seriousness of 
the charges, his other family and medical problems, and the risk of a long period of 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. at 5. 
 87. Children’s Memorial Hospital, Discharge Summary, A.M., Jan. 30, 2000 (on file with authors). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The University of Chicago, Psychiatric Evaluation, A.M., Jan. 6, 2000 (on file with authors). 
 93. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea or Relief from Judgment Pursuant to 705 ILCS 405/2-32, at 
Ex. C, In re A.M., (transcript of court proceedings, Apr. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea] (on file with authors). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 2 (Affidavit of A.M.). 
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detention if he went to trial, Alberto reluctantly decided to take the deal, despite his 
private insistence that he was innocent.  In mid-2000, Alberto accepted the terms as 
read to him by his juvenile court judge and signed a form that required his 
registration as a sex offender for ten years.  That form was later read into the record 
in open court by the prosecutor.96 
Over the next year or so, unsurprisingly, Alberto’s psychological and 
emotional problems only multiplied.  He frequently missed school and counseling 
appointments; stopped taking his medications; had multiple violent episodes 
involving family members and classmates; and, in mid-2001, after again making 
suicidal statements, was hospitalized yet again.97  Over this same time period, his 
parents separated and sought a divorce.98  In November, he was arrested on two 
separate occasions.99 
In early 2002, however, Alberto entered a therapeutic day school and began 
treatment with a new counselor.100  Although his improvements were gradual, they 
were significant.  Over time, Alberto’s violent episodes began to subside.  He 
improved his grades, attended his counseling sessions, and consistently took his 
medication.101  In July 2005, he was discharged from probation, having 
satisfactorily met all the requirements.102  The Cook County Juvenile Probation 
Department issued a report deeming him unlikely to sexually offend in the future; 
and he had not been adjudicated or convicted of any offense—sexual or 
otherwise—since his guilty plea in July 2000.103  Alberto had also consistently 
complied with his annual sex offender registration duties.104 
By his early twenties, it was clear that Alberto had entirely turned his life 
around.  He had graduated from high school and now had a solid career as a 
department head at a home improvement store, enabling him to bring home a 
steady and significant paycheck.105  As such, he was the primary means of financial 
support for his mother and two younger brothers, including Evan, with whom he 
lived.106  He had a committed girlfriend and an older male friend who served as a 
close mentor.107  In his spare time, Alberto wrote motivational lyrics and produced 
his own music.108  He even found time to take some classes at a community 
college; pursuant to sex offender registration regulations, however, he was required 
to alert the administration of his status as a sex offender and eventually dropped out 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id.  
 97. Hartgrove Hospital, Psychological Screening Evaluation, A.M., June 11, 2001 (on file with 
authors); Juvenile Court of Cook County, Supplemental Social Investigation, A.M., Aug. 13, 2001 
[hereinafter Supplemental Social Investigation, Aug. 13, 2001] (on file with authors). 
 98. Supplemental Social Investigation, Aug. 13, 2001, supra note 97, at 4. 
 99. Juvenile Court of Cook County, Supplemental Social Investigation, A.M., Feb. 13, 2002, at 4 
(on file with authors). 
 100. Id.  
 101. Monthly Case Log, A.M., Jan. 2002-July 2005 (on file with authors). 
 102. Juvenile Court of Cook County, Sexual Offense Risk Assessment, Sept. 1, 2010, at 4 (on file 
with authors). 
 103. Id.at 14.   
 104. Id.at 4.   
 105. Id. at 8. 
 106. Id. at 7.   
 107. Id. at 8.   
 108. Id.   
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because he felt ostracized.109   All told, Alberto was eagerly looking forward to July 
2010, when he was due to complete his sex offender registration requirements.  At 
that time, he felt that he finally would be able to move beyond his past life. 
In late 2009, however, Alberto learned something very troubling.  At that time, 
law enforcement informed him that his registration was not due to be terminated 
and that he was going to have to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.110  
Alberto was shocked, as he recalled his lawyer specifically informing him that his 
registration duties would last only ten years.111  That ten-year limit had been a 
crucial factor in Alberto’s choice to plead guilty, as his counsel had thoroughly 
relayed how arduous and embarrassing the registration requirements were.112  
Alberto immediately sought the advice of counsel, hoping that he could either 
terminate his registration requirements or somehow prove his innocence and get the 
charges vacated. 
Alberto’s counsel—who are the authors of this article—soon determined that 
under applicable Illinois law, the offense to which Alberto had pled did in fact 
require lifetime registration, even though Alberto had been a juvenile.113  After 
ordering the court file and transcripts, however, counsel soon discovered that 
Alberto was never informed of this.  To the contrary, the juvenile court judge’s 
guilty plea admonishments specifically stated that Alberto was only required to 
register for ten years.114  A boilerplate court form, signed and initialed by Alberto, 
said the same thing.115  Counsel also interviewed Alberto’s former public defender; 
while she had no specific recollection of the case, she did recall some confusion 
about the length of his sex offender registration obligations.  In a notarized 
affidavit, Alberto swore that his counsel informed him that the requirements would 
last just ten years and that he relied on this information in choosing to plead 
guilty.116 
At the same time, counsel began to investigate Alberto’s claim of innocence by 
speaking to Alberto’s younger brother Evan, the alleged victim.  Alberto had 
warned his counsel that he did not know what Evan was going to say, given that the 
family never had spoken much about the alleged incident.  When counsel met with 
Evan, who was now an eighteen-year-old high school senior, Evan stated without 
hesitation that the assault never happened.117  He told a similar story to Alberto’s, 
in which their mother had overreacted when she saw the two brothers playing 
naked in a family member’s pool.118  He recalled being questioned as a nine-year-
old by multiple police officers about whether Alberto had assaulted him in a sexual 
way and remembered fearing that he was going to go to jail.119  Evan could not 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. 
 110. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, supra note 93, at Ex. D.   
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.   
 113. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2(A-5), (E)(1) (2012); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/7; 1999 Ill. Legis. 
Serv. 91-48 (West) (effective July 1, 1999). 
 114. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, supra note 93. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at Ex. D.   
 117. Affidavit of E.M., April 30, 2010 (on file with authors).   
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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actually recall whether he ultimately had told the police that Alberto had assaulted 
him, but he repeatedly declared that even if he did make that statement, it wasn’t 
true: his brother had never sexually assaulted him in any way.120  Evan signed a 
notarized affidavit attesting to this story and promised to testify consistently in 
court if he was ever called to do so.121  
Armed with this new evidence, Alberto was geared up to pursue relief in the 
Illinois courts.  His counsel intended to raise a claim of actual innocence based on 
Evan’s affidavit as well as due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
based on the affirmative misinformation that Alberto’s attorney had told him about 
the length of his registration requirements.122  
These efforts, however, were soon stymied.  Alberto’s attorney discovered that 
Illinois law precluded juveniles from filing petitions under the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act,123 the traditional means by which a criminal defendant raises non-
forensic claims of actual innocence or constitutional violations based on newly 
discovered evidence.124  Instead, the only way for Alberto to pursue any sort of 
collateral relief in juvenile court was to file a so-called petition for relief from final 
order, a traditional civil remedy that must be raised within one year of the date of 
adjudication.125  One year, of course, had long since passed.  When Alberto 
attempted nevertheless to file claims under this statute, a juvenile court judge 
refused to entertain his claims, citing the time limitation.126  Despite the fact that 
Alberto had evidence of his innocence; that his guilty plea had been extracted 
based on misinformation from his defense attorney, the prosecutor, and even the 
judge; and that the delay in raising these issues was in no way Alberto’s fault, 
Alberto had no legal vehicle for presenting his claims to the court.127  
B.  Robert Taylor and Jonathan Barr 
On the afternoon of November 19, 1991, fourteen-year-old Cateresa Matthews 
was on her way home from school in the close-knit, south Chicago suburb of 
Dixmoor.128  Just as she did every day, Cateresa walked from Rosa L. Parks Middle 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Indeed, the substance of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim appeared to have merit, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court had recently ruled that an adult immigrant who pled guilty to a criminal offense 
after his counsel wrongly advised him that his conviction would not affect his immigration status could 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).  Alberto could 
have argued that affirmative misadvice about sex offender registration status was at least as important a 
collateral matter as immigration consequences and thus that the same result should lie. 
 123. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 to 122-8 (2012). 
 124. In re William M., 795 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ill. 2003). 
 125. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-32 (2012). 
 126. In re A.M., Order, July 26, 2010.  
 127. Alberto’s story does have a happy ending. Although Alberto was never able to prove his 
innocence in court, he applied to be removed from the sex offender registry through an Illinois statute 
that permits certain adjudicated juveniles to terminate their registration obligations early.  See 730 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 150/3-5 (2012).  On March 2, 2011, Alberto was removed from the sex offender registry.  
A.M., Court Order, March 2, 2011.  In total, he spent roughly eight more months on the registry than he 
was instructed he would have to spend. 
 128. Motion for Forensic Testing Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/116-3, at 2-3, People v. Harden, No. 92 CR 
27247 [hereinafter Dixmoor DNA Motion] (on file with authors); Joint Petition For Relief From 
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School to her great-grandmother’s house, where she ate a home-cooked meal.129  
After bidding her great-grandmother goodbye, she walked to a nearby city bus stop, 
where she usually caught the bus that took her home.130  Inexplicably, however, 
Cateresa never arrived home.  As the afternoon stretched into the evening, her 
mother placed several increasingly frantic telephone calls to the local police, 
hospitals, and Cateresa’s friends and schoolmates—all to no avail.  The next 
morning, Cateresa was still nowhere to be found. 
Nearly three weeks later, Cateresa was still considered a missing person by 
authorities when a Dixmoor resident named Jesus Novoa made a shocking 
discovery.  On the afternoon of December 8, Novoa was walking along a grassy 
area next to Interstate 57, which ran through his residential neighborhood.131  
Along a foot-hewn path that ran through tall grasses, he stumbled across the body 
of Cateresa Matthews.132  She was lying on her back with her pants removed and 
her underwear dangling off one ankle.133  A spent .25-caliber bullet casing sat on 
her chest.134  She had been shot in the mouth.135 
After Novoa and his family members called the police, crime scene 
investigators arrived on the scene.  Almost immediately, they concluded that 
Cateresa had been killed recently.  Her body did not show signs of decomposition 
or animal predation, as would be expected after three weeks in an open field.136  
Blood was still draining from her body, also suggesting a recent death.137  And 
rigor mortis, which usually disappears within 36 hours of death, was present in her 
limbs.138  Based on these observations, the medical examiner concluded that she 
had been killed on the day her body was discovered: December 8, 1991.139 
Because her body was found on state property adjacent to an interstate 
highway, the Illinois State Police assumed control of the case.  Their investigation, 
however, led nowhere.  After canvassing the neighborhood and interviewing 
Cateresa’s friends and relatives, police were at an apparent loss for leads.  
                                                                                                                 
Judgment, Immediate Vacation of Convictions, and Release of Petitioners On Their Own Recognizance, 
at 3, People v. Harden, No. 92 CR 27247 [hereinafter Dixmoor Motion to Vacate]. As was the case with 
Alberto, the authors of this article represented Robert Taylor during post-conviction proceedings. Some 
information included herein arises from their personal knowledge and experience with the case.   
 129. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 2-3; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, 
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Beginning in late February 1992, police reports reflect an eight-month period of 
law enforcement inactivity as Cateresa’s murder transformed from an electrifying 
crime into just another cold case.   
That changed in October 1992, when reports reflect that a fifteen-year-old 
student from Rosa Parks Middle School brought police new information.  
According to those reports, this young informant told police that another fifteen-
year-old classmate, Jonathan Barr, had told him that he had seen Cateresa getting 
into a car with two other teens named Robert Taylor and Robert Lee Veal on the 
day she disappeared.140  Interestingly, Barr was the younger brother of Cateresa’s 
ex-boyfriend James Harden.  Both Barr and Harden lived only a half-block away 
from where Cateresa’s body had been found. 
Armed with this information, the police brought Robert Lee Veal to the local 
State’s Attorney’s Office for questioning nine days later.  Like Barr and Taylor, 
Veal was also fifteen; but unlike them, he suffered from severe learning disabilities 
and was generally considered slow.141  Despite his limitations, police interrogated 
Veal about the crime without a parent or guardian present.142  After several hours of 
questioning, Veal agreed to sign a statement that was written out by law 
enforcement.143  In that statement, Veal admitted to participating in the gang-rape 
and murder of Cateresa Matthews, along with four other teens: Jonathan Barr, 
fifteen-year-old Robert Taylor, seventeen-year-old James Harden, and seventeen-
year-old Shainne Sharp.144  
The police arrested and interrogated Robert Taylor next.  Again, after hours of 
interrogation, Taylor did as Veal had done: he signed a statement written out by 
law enforcement in which he admitted to participating in the gang-rape and murder 
of Cateresa with the same group of teens.145  Two days later, police interrogated 
Shainne Sharp under similar circumstances; after enduring nearly a day of 
questioning without a parent or attorney present, he too signed a similar 
statement.146 
The three inculpatory statements all admitted to the same basic nexus of 
events: an assault on Cateresa in the field where her body was found in which at 
least four of the five boys raped her and James Harden shot her.147  The three 
accounts wildly diverged, however, when it came to the surrounding events.  
Taylor described being picked up from school by a car containing the other four 
boys and Cateresa; the group then allegedly drove directly to the field where the 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 3; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 
4; Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 139, at 13. 
 141. See Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 139, at 13. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 5; Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 
139, at 13-14. 
 144. See Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 5; Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 
139, at 13-14. 
 145. See Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 5; Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 
139, at 13-14. 
 146. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 3-4; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, 
at 5. 
 147. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 3-4; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, 
at 4-5. 
2012] ADJUDICATED JUVENILES AND COLLATERAL RELIEF 571 
assault occurred.148  Sharp described being picked up from a basketball game by a 
car containing Taylor, Harden, and Veal—although he didn’t know Veal’s name 
and called him simply “the light-skinned dude”—and then being driven to 
Harden’s house to play dice, where Barr and Cateresa joined them.149  For his part, 
Veal described being picked up on his way home from a local candy store by 
Taylor, Harden, and Sharp, who were in a car together; a few minutes later, they 
also picked up Barr and Cateresa and supposedly drove straight to the crime 
scene.150  All three teens, however, agreed on one key fact.  According to all three 
confessions, the assault and murder happened on the same day that Cateresa 
disappeared: November 19, 1991. 
Following the confessions, all five teens were arrested and charged with a host 
of offenses, including Cateresa’s sexual assault and murder.  As the defendants 
awaited trial, law enforcement decided to take one further investigative step in 
order to corroborate the confessions with physical evidence: using then-nascent 
DNA testing techniques, they asked the Illinois State Police Crime Lab to compare 
the DNA from the semen left inside Cateresa’s body against the DNA of the 
charged boys.151  That scientific testing, however, left law enforcement with two 
surprising results.  First, it turned out that the DNA had been left by a single 
male— not by four or five different individuals, as would be consistent with the 
three confessions.152  Second, and even more notably, scientific testing 
conclusively established that the semen had not been left by any of the five charged 
teens.  Instead, it belonged to some unknown man.153 
Despite this startling result, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office 
barreled forward with all five prosecutions.  Because of their ages, Taylor and Barr 
had to be charged in juvenile court, meaning that they faced far less prison time if 
they were adjudicated delinquent.  The State of Illinois, however, proceeded to file 
motions requesting their transfer to adult criminal court, where they would face 
sentences of life in prison.  After hearing argument, the juvenile court judge made a 
shocking decision: despite the seriousness of the charged offenses, he declined to 
transfer Taylor and Barr’s cases to adult criminal court.154  In so concluding, he 
reasoned that despite the existence of multiple written confessions, there was not 
sufficient evidence such that a grand jury would be expected to issue an indictment 
in adult proceedings.155  Key to his decision was the fact that the three confessions 
simply got the date of Cateresa’s death wrong: “How could they charge these guys 
with killing and raping this girl on November 19?  She didn’t die until December 
8.”156 
The State immediately appealed this decision and the Illinois Appellate Court 
                                                                                                                 
 148. See Confession of Robert Taylor, October 29, 1992 (on file with authors). 
 149. Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 6-7. 
 150. Id.   
 151. See Dixmoor DNA Motion, supra note 128, at 5; Dixmoor Motion to Vacate, supra note 128, at 
5; Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 139, at 14-15. 
 152. See Dixmoor Direct Appeal Brief, supra note 128, at 14-15. 
 153. Id.   
 154. See In re R.T. & J.B., 648 N.E. 2d 1043, 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1046. 
572 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2 
reversed, sending Taylor and Barr’s cases straight to adult criminal court.157  With 
all five teenage defendants now facing adult time, the State was in a powerful 
position.  Prosecutors accordingly offered Sharp and Veal sweetheart deals: if they 
pled guilty and testified against Harden, Taylor, and Barr, they would serve only 
about eight more years in prison.158  Both Sharp and Veal accepted the deals, and 
based on their testimony (and, in Taylor’s case, on his confession), Harden, Taylor, 
and Barr were convicted as adults and sentenced to the equivalent of life in 
prison.159 
Some seventeen years later, attorneys for Harden, Taylor, and Barr (including 
the authors of this article, who represented Robert Taylor) filed post-conviction 
motions for DNA testing.160  During those seventeen years, law enforcement had 
constructed the national CODIS database, which contains the DNA profiles of 
various criminal offenders and other individuals.161  Although it was already known 
that the DNA left on Cateresa’s body did not belong to the defendants, defense 
attorneys reasoned that perhaps the DNA donor could finally be identified.  After 
the trial court agreed to grant the motions, the DNA testing proceeded, and on 
March 9, 2011, it was finally learned that the DNA belonged to a man named 
Willie Randolph. 
Additional investigation revealed damning information about Randolph.  At 
the time of Cateresa’s murder, he had been thirty-three years old—much older than 
the five convicted defendants or the victim.162  He had lived, moreover, only a mile 
away from Cateresa’s great-grandmother’s house in Dixmoor.163  And he had a 
history of sexual violence.  In 1977, Randolph had been convicted for raping a 
woman on the street.164  Perhaps most strikingly, when he was in his early twenties, 
he also reportedly sexually assaulted his thirteen-year-old girlfriend in the very 
same field in which Cateresa’s body was later found in 1991.165 
Armed with this new evidence, defense attorneys filed post-conviction motions 
to vacate the convictions of all five of the convicted defendants.166  After the State 
eventually dropped its opposition to those motions, the court vacated the 
convictions of Harden, Taylor, and Barr on November 3, 2011—only sixteen days 
shy of the twentieth anniversary of Cateresa’s disappearance.167  Now in their mid-
thirties, Harden, Taylor, and Barr were immediately released from prison; within 
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weeks, the guilty pleas and convictions of Sharp and Veal, who had long ago 
finished their reduced prison sentences, were vacated too.  As of the writing of this 
article, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office has not filed charges against 
Willie Randolph in connection with the death of Cateresa Matthews. 
The story of these five defendants carries, at the least, the satisfaction of 
knowing that a long-festering injustice was corrected, albeit decades too late, 
through post-conviction proceedings.  But the frightening corollary to that reality is 
the knowledge that in Illinois, such a resolution might not have been available for 
Taylor and Barr if their cases had remained in juvenile court as the original judge 
had ordered.  The Illinois statutory provision that enabled them to file their motion 
for DNA testing—chapter 725, act 5, section 116-3 of the Illinois Compiled 
Statutes—permits a defendant to move for forensic testing in the trial court that 
entered judgment on his or her “conviction.”  Generally speaking, Illinois 
jurisprudence has distinguished between juveniles “adjudicated delinquent” in 
juvenile court and adults “convicted” in criminal court.168  Juveniles, for instance, 
are not permitted to file post-conviction petitions under the Illinois Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act.169  While no case in Illinois has yet extended this reasoning to post-
conviction motions for DNA testing, that legal vehicle may well be deemed 
unavailable to juveniles too; at minimum, it is unclear whether juveniles have 
access to DNA testing after their adjudications.  Thus, despite the righteousness of 
their cause, access to the exonerating power of post-conviction DNA testing could 
easily have been denied to Taylor and Barr if their cases had remained in juvenile 
court—a sad irony, given that the institution of juvenile court was intended to 
provide extra protections for juveniles. 
 IV. CONCLUSION 
In most ways, of course, Alberto was very lucky that his case was adjudicated 
in juvenile court rather than transferred to adult criminal court.  The charges against 
him were very serious and could have carried up to thirty years in prison if he had 
been convicted in criminal court.170  Robert Taylor and Jonathan Barr, for their 
part, were equally unlucky: had their cases remained in juvenile court, they would 
have been out of prison no later than their twenty-first birthdays instead of 
languishing behind bars until their mid-thirties for a crime they did not commit.  
On the other hand, Illinois laws prevented Alberto from pursuing his innocence 
post-adjudication or arguing that he had received constitutionally deficient counsel 
because he was tried in juvenile court, while Robert and Jonathan were able to 
clear their names only because they were subjected to the jurisdiction and penalties 
of criminal court.  Such a result is nothing short of perverse. 
Because juveniles like Alberto, Robert, and Jonathan face a heightened risk of 
wrongful conviction and a potentially heightened risk of ineffective assistance of 
counsel—and because the direct and collateral consequences of delinquency 
adjudications can be severe—it is fair, just, and urgently necessary for legislatures 
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to amend collateral remedy statutes to ensure access for adjudicated juveniles.  The 
required amendment is uncomplicated: in the context of DNA testing, the forty-one 
jurisdictions that currently make relief available to those who have been 
“convicted” of crimes should simply add the phrase “or adjudicated delinquent” to 
their statutes.  That is essentially what Colorado, the District of Columbia, New 
Hampshire, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have done, and the addition of those 
simple words has brought a dictionary’s worth of clarity to the law.  Indeed, the 
same thing can be done in statutes governing the availability of non-forensic 
collateral remedies.  These simple amendments will ensure that adjudicated 
juveniles are given the same desperately needed access to collateral proceedings 
that convicted adults receive. 
One Virginia legislator is more than doing his part.  Moved by the story of 
Virginia teen Edgar Coker, Jr., Republican General Assembly Delegate Gregory D. 
Habeeb has introduced legislation in Virginia that would actually increase 
juveniles’ post-conviction access even above the level of access that convicted 
adults typically receive.171  Edgar Coker, Jr. spent seventeen months in juvenile 
detention—and still remains on the sex offender registry—after he pled guilty to 
raping a fourteen-year-old peer.172  He entered the plea instead of risking adult 
charges and a far greater sentence.173  Since that time, however, Edgar’s “victim” 
has admitted that she lied about being raped and that she had consented to the 
sex.174  She and her mother have been fighting to vacate Edgar’s adjudication and 
remove him from the sex offender registry, but the Virginia courts have refused, 
claiming that their jurisdiction ended once Edgar was no longer on parole.175  
Delegate Habeeb has taken steps to correct this situation by introducing a bill that 
would allow adjudicated juveniles who plead guilty to seek a post-conviction writ 
of innocence; currently, neither adults nor juveniles who plead guilty may seek that 
form of relief.176  In so doing, he has recognized the critical importance of juvenile 
access to collateral proceedings. 
Legislators, advocates, and other stakeholders throughout the country must 
take similar steps to amend the law in their home jurisdictions to ensure that 
juveniles and adults have equal access to collateral relief.  For Alberto, Robert, 
Jonathan, Edgar, and many more like them around the country, such steps could 
represent huge advances in juveniles’ access to justice. 
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